By: Miracle Seer -Personal Assistant to the Attorney General

The ongoing dispute between Sierra Leone’s Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Alpha Sesay Esq., and the President of the Sierra Leone Bar Association, Madam Tuma Gento-Kamara, is no longer merely a disagreement over the scheduling of an Annual General Meeting. It has evolved into a broader constitutional question concerning authority, institutional responsibility, and respect for the legal order.

At the heart of the controversy lies a fundamental fact that Mrs. Tuma Gento-Kamara appears reluctant to acknowledge: the Attorney General is not just another lawyer expressing a personal opinion. He is the principal legal adviser to the Government of Sierra Leone, a constitutional office holder, Minister of Justice, and the acknowledged Titular Head of the Bar.

While Mrs. Gento-Kamara repeatedly characterises the Attorney General’s intervention as “ultra vires,” “constitutionally untenable,” and a form of “executive fiat,” her response conspicuously avoids addressing the central issue raised in the Attorney General’s letter: the expiration of the Executive’s mandate and the legality of an indefinite postponement of the Association’s AGM.

The Attorney General’s letter is anchored on two legal pillars. First, Article 20 of the SLBA’s Memorandum and Articles of Association establishes a two-year tenure for the Executive. Second, Section 185 of the Companies Act imposes a statutory obligation to hold Annual General Meetings within prescribed timelines. These are not political arguments. They are legal propositions.

Notably, Mrs. Gento-Kamara does not point to any provision in the Articles that expressly authorises an Executive whose tenure has expired to postpone an AGM indefinitely. Instead, she relies heavily on broad theories of independence and self-regulation while avoiding the obvious question: if the Executive’s mandate expired on 17 May 2026 , by what authority can that same Executive continue exercising powers indefinitely without fresh approval from members?

The most revealing language in her response is the assertion that the Attorney General’s letter should be treated as a “non-binding legal opinion.” Such a characterisation is difficult to reconcile with constitutional reality. The Attorney General is the chief legal authority of the Republic. While he may not be a court of law, his interpretation of legal obligations cannot casually be reduced to the status of an ordinary opinion from a private practitioner.

Equally striking is the President’s declaration that the Executive will announce an AGM date “within three months.” This concession inadvertently weakens her own argument. If there is no urgency, why commit to a three-month timeline? If the postponement was lawful and justified, why suddenly impose a deadline? The answer appears obvious: because the pressure generated by the Attorney General’s intervention exposed the untenable nature of an indefinite postponement.

The response also contains a significant contradiction. On one hand, Mrs. Gento-Kamara insists that the Executive remains fully empowered under a holdover provision. On the other hand, she argues that disputes concerning the Executive’s mandate must be resolved by the High Court. If the Executive’s authority is as clear as she suggests, there would be no need to defer the question to judicial determination.

Perhaps the most sensitive and troubling language appears in her warning that the Attorney General’s intervention “crosses a constitutional line” and amounts to “unlawful interference.” Such wording elevates a governance disagreement into a direct challenge against the constitutional standing of the Attorney General. It risks creating the impression that the leadership of the Association considers itself answerable to no institutional authority until compelled by a court order.

That position is difficult to sustain. The independence of the Bar does not mean immunity from scrutiny. Independence cannot be transformed into a shield against accountability. Nor can self-governance become a justification for extending mandates beyond constitutional and statutory limits.

The Attorney General’s letter does not dissolve the Bar Association, suspend its Executive, or usurp the jurisdiction of the courts. It simply reminds the Association of its legal obligations and calls for compliance with its governing instruments. That is entirely consistent with his role as the nation’s chief law officer and Titular Head of the Bar.

The broader constitutional principle is straightforward. Every institution, including the Bar Association, must operate within the limits of its governing documents. Where a mandate expires, legitimacy must return to the membership. Where an AGM is due, members—not an outgoing Executive—must determine the future direction of the Association.

The Attorney General’s warning that the AGM belongs to the membership and not the Executive may ultimately prove to be the strongest legal argument in this entire dispute. In a democratic professional body, sovereignty rests with the members. Any action that indefinitely delays their opportunity to exercise that sovereignty inevitably attracts legitimate legal scrutiny.

This is therefore not a contest between executive power and Bar independence. It is a contest between institutional accountability and institutional self-preservation. On that question, the Attorney General’s position appears firmly rooted in both the spirit of the Companies Act and the democratic principles underlying the Bar Association’s own constitutional framework.